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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this Brief "T" refers to the transcript of the proceedings from the trial, followed
by the date of the hearing to designate the volume. "R" refers to the record of the Court,
and "Ex" refers to exhibit, followed by the exhibit number. Interested Party/Appellant,
Bruce Petersen, will hereinafter be referred to as Petersen and Plaintiff/Appellee, State of
Utah, will hereinafter be referred to as the State and Defendant/Appellant, All Real
Property, will hereinafter be referred to as Defendant Property.

ML & WALL (A PC.)
TORNEYS AT LAW
>0. HIGHLAND DRIVE
Minn

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j), Section 5, Article VIII of the Utah Constitution and Rule
3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR
REVIEW.
ISSUE ONE: Did the trial commit error by not granting Defendant
Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment due to the State's failure to properly serve
Defendant Petersen with it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of
Seizure/Intent to Forfeit as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and/or Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d).
STANDARD OF REVIEW. No deference. In re J.D.M.. a person under eighteen
years of age v. A.W. Lauritzen, 810 P.2d 494, and review for correctness. Keller v.
Southward North Medical Pavellion. Inc., 959 P.2d 102.
ISSUE TWO: Did the trial court's refusal to grant Petersen's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and it's failure to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in support of it's decision constitute an abuse of discretion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a
default judgment and abuse of that discretion must be clearly shown. Katz v. Pierce, 732
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Court's ruling must be based on adequate findings of fact and
on the law. May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984).
ISSUE THREE: Did the trial court commit error by granting the State a
Judgment of Forfeiture of Defendant Property without making findings as to the
proportionality of said forfeiture to the severity of the offense and whether said
forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the United States Constitution and
2

Section 9 of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Factual findings made by trial court's in conducting
excessiveness inquiries must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. State v. Real Property
at 633 East 640 North. Orem. Utah. (Utah 2000).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES.
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 (1962)
Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000);
State of Utah v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North. Orem. (Utah 2000);
Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997);
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2);
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k);
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(a);
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(b);
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d);
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
Article I, Section 9, of the Utah State Constitution:
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
shall cruel and unusual punishment be inflicted.

3

RULES.
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is an appeal from a ruling of the Third

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Stephen Henriod presiding
wherein the District Court entered a default judgment against Defendant Property
ordering the forfeiture of said property. Said default judgment was granted based upon
the failure of Petersen to file an answer on behalf of the Defendant Property to the State's
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit, copies of
which were mailed to Petersen, rather than personally served. While it is the State's
claim that service by mail was authorized, it is Petersen's contention that rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), the statute
which governs service of the Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit mandates that Petersen,
as a claimant to Defendant Property and an indicted defendant should have been
personally served with process and service by mail if allowed, should only have occurred
by order of the Court. In addition, the District Court failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of it's default judgment notwithstanding Petersen's request
to do so and further failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which
reconciled the proportionality of the seizure to the severity of the crime.

4

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Verified Complaint for Forfeiture (R. 1)
Certificate & Proof of Service and Motion for Entry of Default (R. 8)
Judgment of Forfeiture (R. 11)
Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit (R. 13)
Default Certificate (R. 15)
Notice of Entry of Judgment (R. 17)
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 20)
Certified Mail on Return (R. 25)
Minute Entry (R. 54)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 56)
Order Denying Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 63)
Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R. 66)
Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 68)
Response to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Bruce Petersen's Motion for
Reconsideration (R. 79)
Minute Entry (R. 93)
Order Denying Bruce Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 95)
C.

DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW:

5

The Trial Court granted the State's Default Judgment against Defendant Property
and subsequently denied Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for
Reconsideration or in the Alternative make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Bruce Petersen, is the owner of the Defendant Real Property located at 736 North
Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. That on or about January, 1997, Petersen was charged with three counts of
drug related violations in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, in Case
No. 2:97-CR-0035J styled as United States of America v. Bruce Earl Petersen and Sonny
Craig Petersen, (R. 34).
3. That Petersen was arrested on these charges on or about February 6, 1997, and
was taken to the Salt Lake County metro jail. He was bailed out on or about February 8,
1997.
4. After bonding out of jail Petersen resided at his sister, Jeanette's residence
located at 626 North Colorado Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Pre-trial services, all of the
prosecution and police agencies were informed of or with little effort could have
ascertained Petersen's whereabouts while he was staying with his sister.
5. A Verified Complaint for Forfeiture was filed by the State against the
Defendant Property on or about May 30, 1997. (R. 1)
6. On or about May 30, 1997, a copy of the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in
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this matter, along with a Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit was mailed to
Petersen at Defendant Property, to-wit: 736 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
however, the United States Postal Service changed the mailing address of the certified
mail to 626 North Colorado Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 25)
7. That on June 23, 1997, Petersen was placed back in the Salt Lake County
metro jail where he stayed until July 30th, 1997. All authorities involved in the case were
apprised of Petersen's whereabouts.
8. That on or about July 17, 1997, in the United States District Court, Petersen
was convicted on two counts of the indictment filed against him.
9. That on or about July 30, 1997, Petersen was transferred to a jail in Pocatello,
Idaho, where he stayed until September 11, 1997, and was then transferred to the Davis
County jail.
10. At no time was Petersen ever served, either personally nor did he receive
through the mail, a copy of the Verified Complaint or the Notice of Seizure/Intent to
Forfeit which was filed by the State in this matter.
11. Petersen was never made aware that an action had been filed until a default
judgment had been entered against him.
12. That on or about August 11,1997, the District Court entered the Default
Judgment of Forfeiture against Defendant Property. (R. 11)
13. On November 4, 1997, Petersen as record owner of Defendant Property filed
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his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 20)
14. On or about November 12, 1999, Petersen filed his Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment alleging therein that there
was improper service of the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture as well as the Notice of
Seizure/Intent to Forfeit. (R. 26)
15. On December 2, 1999, the State filed it's Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Vacate Judgment by Default. (R. 45)
16. On December 27, 1999, the Court entered it's Minute Entry summarily
denying Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Default without providing any Findings of Fact
or Conclusions of Law to support it's ruling. (R. 54)
17. On November 11, 2000, the State submitted it's proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Claimant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
(R. 56)
18. On January 13, 2000, Petersen filed his Objection to the State's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Claimant's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment, Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Request for Hearing. (R. 66)
19. On February 3, 2000, the State filed it's Memorandum In Opposition To
Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Request for Hearing. (R. 72)
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20. On February 18, 2000, Defendant Petersen filed his Response to the State's
Memorandum In Opposition To Bruce Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. 79)
21. On March 8, 2000, the Court issued it's Minute Entry Summarily Denying
Petersen's Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative to Make Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Request for Hearing without any finding. (R. 93)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. Did the Trial Court error by not granting Petersen's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment on the basis of insufficiency of service of the Verified Complaint
for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit.
The State filed it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent
to Forfeit with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court alleging therein that because
Defendant Property was found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances and was
derived from proceeds traceable to an illegal controlled substance transaction or
exchange, said property should be forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated §58-37-13(2). Copies of the Verified Complaint and Notice of Seizure/Notice
of Intent to Forfeit were mailed by certified mail to Defendant Property and were not
personally served as required by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah
Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d). Moreover, if it was the State's intent to prosecute it's
forfeiture claim under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(a) through
(2)(j) then it failed to comply with the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13,
which governs and directs how a forfeiture proceeding under these provisions is to be
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prosecuted.
POINT II. The Court's denial of Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment
constituted an abuse of discretion in that the Court's denial resulted in a denial of
the furtherance of justice and because the Court made no findings of fact or rulings
based upon the law to support it's denial.
The Trial Court's summary denial of Defendant Petersen's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment absent any findings of fact and conclusions of law reconciling it's ruling with
the arguments put forth by Defendant Petersen alleging insufficiency of service of
process and reasons, excuses and justifications for not answering the State's Verified
Complaint for Forfeiture constituted a clear abuse of discretion.
POINT III. The Trial Court errored by failing to make Findings of Fact as
to the proportionality of the forfeiture to the severity of the offense and whether
said forfeiture constituted an excessive fine prohibited by the 8th Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution.
The failure of the Trial Court to make a determination that Defendant Property
was an instrumentality of the offense and to then examine whether the ordered forfeiture
was "grossly disproportionate" to the offense violated the federal and state constitutional
prohibition against excessive fines.
ARGUMENT DETAIL
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR BY NOT GRANTING PETERSEN'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF
SERVICE OF THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR FORFEITURE AND
NOTICE OF SEIZURE/INTENT TO FORFEIT
On May 30, 1997, the State filed it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice
10

of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court alleging
therein that because Defendant Property was found "in proximity to forfeitable controlled
substances" etc. and was "derived from proceeds traceable to an illegal controlled
substance transaction or exchange in violation of the Utah Controlled Substances Act",
said property should be forfeited pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
§58-37-13(2)(k).(R. 1-3)
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k), provides as follows:
(2) the following are subject to forfeiture and no
property rights exist in them:
(k) all proceeds traceable to any
violation of this chapter. There is a rebuttable
presumption that all money, coins, and currency
found in proximity to forfeitable controlled
substances, drug manufacturing equipment or
supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or
forfeitable records of importation, manufacture,
or distribution of controlled substances are
proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter.
The burden of proof is upon the claimant of the
property to rebut this presumption. (R. 1-3)
While Petersen questions whether this was the correct provision to seek forfeiture
of Defendant Property since said real property was not procured by proceeds resulting
from the violation of this chapter, the fact this is the provision the State relied upon in
seeking forfeiture of Defendant Property is important in that it governs the procedures to
be followed in the forfeiture action. In this regard, Utah Code Annotated §58-3713(9)(c) directs how a forfeiture action under this provision shall be commenced. In
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pertinent part, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(c), provides as follows:
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection
(2)(k) shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if
within a prosecution district, the district attorney, or by
the attorney general, either in personam as part of a
criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem
action against the property alleged to be proceeds, and
filed in the county where the property is seized or
encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the
state...
Conspicuously absent from this provision is any direction concerning how a
complaint for forfeiture filed under Subsection 2(k) is to be served, however, Utah Code
Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), does direct that in such a forfeiture action a Notice of
Seizure and Intended Forfeiture shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court and served
upon all persons who have a claim in the property and directs how service is to be
accomplished. Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), provides as follows:
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall
be filed with the Clerk of the Court, and served upon
all persons known to the county attorney or district
attorney to have a claim in the property by:
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is
charged in a criminal information or indictment:
and
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose
name and address is known or to each owner
whose right, title, or interest is of record in the
Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given
upon the records of the division, which service
is considered complete even though the mail is
refused or cannot be forwarded. The county
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general
shall make one publication in a newspaper of
12

general circulation in the county where the
seizure was made for all other claimants whose
addresses are unknown, but who are believed to
have an interest in the property. (Emphasis
added)
Since Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(c) is silent as to how the Complaint
seeking forfeiture under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k) is to be served, it is
assumed that since this action is defined as a civil action, that service of such a
Complaint shall be accomplished in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(1 )(a) defines "Complaint" under this act as
follows:
Property subject to forfeiture-Seizure-Procedure.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in
rem complaint seeking forfeiture....is subject to
forfeiture. (Emphasis added)
Rule 4, which governs service of process in a civil action provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Rule 4(e)(1) Personal service.
Personal service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by
subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by delivering a
copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the
individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the
individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion there
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by
13

appointment or by law to receive service of process;
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed
at a facility operated by the state or any of its political
subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the person who
has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian
or conservator of the individual to be served if one has
been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly
deliver the process to the individual served;
(g) Other service. Where the identity or
whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown
and cannot be ascertained through reasonable
diligence, where service upon all of the individual
parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or
where there exists good cause to believe that the
person to be served is avoiding service of process, the
party seeking service of process may file a motion
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing
service by publication, by mail, or by some other
means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the
efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be
served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. If
the motion is granted, the court shall order service of
process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the
court, by other means, or by some combination of the
above, provided that the means of notice employed
shall be reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action to the extent reasonably
possible or practicable. The court's order shall also
specify the content of the process to be served and the
event or events as of which service shall be deemed
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served
upon the defendant with the process specified by the
court. (Emphasis added)
Clearly, the State has not effected service of it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4 in that personal service was admittedly not
14

accomplished nor did Plaintiff comply with the provisions of Rule 4(g) concerning how
service by mail was to be accomplished. Accordingly, if service of the complaint for
forfeiture is governed by Rule 4, the Court was without jurisdiction to grant the State's
default judgment since service of Plaintiff s Verified Complaint of Forfeiture did not
comply with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the event Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), governs service of Plaintiff s
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture as well as the Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit,
Petersen still contends that the State's service by mail was insufficient since Petersen, as
a claimant, had, previous to the filing of the State's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture,
been charged in a criminal indictment which necessitated that the State personally serve
him, if not with both the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure and
Intended Forfeiture then with at least the Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit.
Consequently, since the State's service by mail was in contravention of the requirements
of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), said service was insufficient. Accordingly, if
service of the State's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture and Notice of Seizure/Intent to
Forfeit is governed by Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9)(d), then the Court was
without jurisdiction to grant the State's default judgment against Defendant Property and
consequently errored in failing to grant Defendant Petersen's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment based upon insufficiency of service of process.
While the State in it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture does not allege grounds
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other than those specified under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(k) as the basis for
it's forfeiture action, Petersen believes it is necessary to reconcile how the State
prosecuted it's forfeiture with all provisions of the Utah Controlled Substance Act in the
interest of addressing all possible arguments that may be raised by the State in justifying
it's actions concerning it's forfeiture action against the Defendant Property since the
State may construe it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture as sufficiently broad to
encompass all the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2) as the basis for it's
forfeiture action.
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(9) provides that forfeiture proceedings brought
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j) should be commenced as follows:
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as
follows:
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a)
through (2)(j), a complaint shall be prepared by the
county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the
district attorney, or the attorney general, and filed in a
court of record where the property was seized or is to
be seized...
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a
criminal defendant, the forfeiture shall proceed as part
of the criminal prosecution as an in personam action
against the defendant's interest in the property subject
to forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written
answer to the complaint, but may acknowledge or
deny interest in the property at the time of first
appearance on the criminal charges...
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by
the defendant, the determination of forfeiture
shall be stayed until resolution of the criminal
charges.
16

Since Petersen had been charged as a Defendant in a criminal prosecution, the
forfeiture proceedings under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(2)(a) through (2)(j) should
have proceeded as part of the criminal prosecution and Petersen was absolved of the
responsibility of filing an answer to the complaint filed under these subsections.
Accordingly, if the State argues that it's Verified Complaint for Forfeiture seeks the
forfeiture of the Defendant Property under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §5837-13(2)(a) through (2)(j) then the State's failure to proceed with the forfeiture of the
Defendant Property as part of the criminal prosecution as required by Utah Code
Annotated §58-37-13(9)(a) and (b) is in contravention of the provisions of the statute and
therefore must necessarily render the Court's default judgment against the Defendant
Property as null and void.
POINT II
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF PETERSEN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT
THE COURT'S DENIAL DID NOT RESULT IN A FURTHERANCE OF
JUSTICE AND BECAUSE THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS OF FACT
OR RULINGS BASED UPON THE LAW TO SUPPORT IT'S DENIAL AND
RECONCILE THE COURT'S DENIAL WITH THE REASONS. JUSTIFICATIONS
AND EXCUSES FOR PETERSEN'S FAILURE TO ANSWER
Clearly, it has been a long standing legal principle that judgments by default are
not favored, nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play. See Heathman v. Fabian
& Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 (1962), and Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), and while the Trial Court does have broad discretion in deciding whether to
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set aside a judgment, such discretion is not unlimited. The Court's ruling must be based
on adequate findings of fact and on the law and at least with regards to a claim of
insufficiency of service of process, must issue a brief written statement setting forth the
ground or grounds for it's decision. Moreover, the Court's exercise of discretion should
be exercised in furtherance of justice, and should incline towards granting relief in a
doubtful case to the end the party may have a hearing. In Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277
(Utah 2000), our Supreme Court held as follows:
...a trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether
to set aside a default judgment. See Katz v. Pierce,
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Though
broad, the court's discretion is not unlimited. As a
threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on
adequate findings of fact" and "on the law." May v.
Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per
curiam). A decision premised on flawed legal
conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse of
discretion. (Emphasis added)
Moreover, the nature of a default judgment and
the equitable nature of rule 60 provide further limits.
See id, see also Schwab v. Bullocks, Inc., 508 F.2d
353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974) (explaining limits to trial
court's discretion under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60 (which is virtually identical to Utah's
Rule 60)); 11 Charles Ann Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§2857, at 257-58 (2d ed.1995) (stating that "[b]ased
on the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of
the district court to deny a motion for relief is limited."
For example, we have stated that a trial court's
"discretion should be exercised in furtherance of
justice and should incline towards granting relief in a
doubtful case to the end that the party may have a
18

hearing. Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079,
1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953)); see
also Katz, 732 P.2d at 93 (stating that courts should be
indulgent toward vacating default judgments where
the defaulted party demonstrates a reasonable
justification or excuse for failing to answer).
Likewise, we have stated that "if default is issued
when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where,
absent such a mistake, default would not have
occurred, the equity side of the court...[should] grant
relief." May. 677 P.2d 1110. (Emphasis added)
Based on these principles, this court has stated
that "'it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is
made to set it aside." Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081
(quoting Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah
2d, 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (1962). Thus, while we
review the trial court's decision in the instant case for
abuse of discretion, we emphasize that the court's
discretion is not unlimited. (Emphasis added)
Further, Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in pertinent part provides as
follows:
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
...the trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions. The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the
ground for its decision on all motions granted under
Rule 12(b).
Rule 12(b) provides as follows:
Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to
19
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claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion:
...(5) insufficiency of process.
A
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Here the Trial Court made no attempt to reconcile it's ruling with the facts and legal
arguments raised as to the sufficiency of service of the Verified Complaint, Forfeiture
Complaint and Notice of Seizure/Intent to Forfeit filed in this matter nor did it issue a
brief written statement setting forth the grounds for its' decision as required by Rule 52
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
When considering the undisputed facts that Petersen was charged in a criminal
indictment, incarcerated for significant periods, had moved from his original address and
his whereabouts easily ascertainable by the State, all of which clearly suggests a
reasonable justification for Petersen's failure to answer the Verified Complaint for
Forfeiture, and further considering that the statute clearly mandates that service of at least
the Notice of Seizure/Notice of Intent to Forfeit is to be accomplished by personal
service upon a claimant charged in an indictment as well as the requirements of Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which likewise require personal service upon a party
to a civil action and that service by mail only be permitted by Order of the Court, the
Court's refusal to make any findings of fact reconciling it's ruling with these undisputed
facts notwithstanding Defendant's request to do so by virtue of it's Motion for
Reconsideration is clearly an abuse of the Court's discretion which has produced an
20

unjust result violative of Defendant Petersen's due process rights.
Although the Court did sign and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law said
findings of fact and conclusions of law were those prepared by the State and do not
represent any findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Court nor do they
address or reconcile any of the factual and legal reasons, excuses and justifications,
raised and asserted by Defendant Petersen for why he did not answer the State's Verified
Complaint for Forfeiture.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS
OF FACT AS TO THE PROPORTIONATELY OF THE FORFEITURE
TO THE SEVERITY OF THE OFFENSE AND WHETHER SAID
FORFEITURE CONSTITUTED AN EXCESSIVE FINE
Our Supreme Court in State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, Utah.
999 P.2d 1254,1257 (Utah 2000), held that both the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution prohibits
forfeitures that are "grossly disproportionate" to the offense and that in order to grant
such a forfeiture, the Trial Court must do an assessment analyzing whether the Defendant
Property is an instrumentality of the offense and whether the forfeiture was "grossly
disproportionate" to the offense. The Court held as follows:
We similarly hold that the threshold test in real
property forfeitures is whether the defendant property
is an instrumentality of the offense. If instrumentality
is proven, we must then examine whether the ordered
forfeiture is "grossly disproportionate" to the offense...
21

The fact that the trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of
law respecting a determination as to whether the Defendant Property was an
instrumentality of the offense and then whether the ordered forfeiture was grossly
disproportionate to the offense violated Petersen's federal and state constitutional rights
that prohibits the imposition of excusive fines. The violation of these constitutional
rights requires a remand to the Trial Court for a evidentiary hearing to render a ruling
that comports with the Court's holding in this case.
CONCLUSION
The State's failure to serve Defendant Petersen with process in accordance with
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Utah Code Annotated §58-3713(9)(d) rendered the Court without jurisdiction to grant the State a default judgment
against Defendant Property. Moreover, the Court's failure to grant Defendant Petersen's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment without issuing a statement setting forth the ground or
grounds for it's denial or findings reconciling the numerous factors which militated
against letting the judgment stand was a clear abuse of discretion and more importantly
an abrogation of the Court's responsibility to ensure a fair and just result and that the
result was in conformity with it's legal requirements as established and imposed by
statute and rule.
Finally, the Court's ruling is a grave miscarriage of justice in that the forfeiture of
Defendant Property has occurred absent a determination that said property was an
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instrumentality of the offense and forfeiture of the same was not "grossly
disproportionate" to the offense. This omission by the Trial Court was violative of
Defendant Petersen's constitutional rights and requires a reversal of the Court's ruling
denying Petersen's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and a remand for an evidentiary
hearing to determine the appropriateness and legality of said forfeiture.
DATED this %£- <*ay of April, 2001.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant/Appellant was [ ] mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] sent via facsimile transmission,
[K hand-delivered on this Ju day of April, 2001, to the following:

Clark Harms
Lana Taylor
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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E. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
F. Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13
G. State of Utah v. Real Property at 633 east 640 North. Orem. Utah. 994 P.2d 1254
(Utah 2000)
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ADDENDUM C

UTAH RULES OK CIVIL ^KUUfcUUKr,
failure to comply with requirement that he
serve or mail a copy of the complaint to the
defendant is not fatal to trial court's jurisdiction over the defendant; fact that envelope
containing the copy of the complaint was addressed to another person, as well as to the
defendant, did not invalidate the trial court's
jurisdiction, which attached upon the service of
the summons, over the defendant. Bawden &
Assocs. v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1981).

Variance b e t w e e n
plaint

Statute of limitations

Cited in State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493
P.2d 604 (1972); State v. Poteet, 692 P2d 760
(Utah 1984); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245
(Utah 1988); Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449
(Utah 1989); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger,
841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Wilcox v.
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996).

— F i l i n g of c o m p l a i n t
Where complaint was filed within period of
limitations, action was not barred, even though
summons was not served until after such period. Keyser v. Pollock, 20 Utah 371, 59 P. 87
(1899).

summons

and

com-

—Title
Without some showing of prejudice, variance
between title of the summons and the title of
the complaint was not a proper basis to set
aside default judgment granted by trial court.
Bawden & Assocs. v. Smith, 624 R2d 676 (Utah
1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 103;
61AAm. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to 352; 62B
Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 8, 9.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 54 et seq.; 71
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412; 72 C.J.S. Process
§ 3.

A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business
within state for purposes of state "closed-door"
statute barring unqualified or unregistered foreign corporation from local courts — modern
cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 466.

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and
served.
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c) Contents of summons.
(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which it is
brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and
telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time within which the
defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the
defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered
against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the
court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten days of
service.
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state
that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed within 10 days
after service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court
where the defendant may call at least 13 days after service to determine if the
complaint has been filed.
(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the
subject matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that the
complaint is on file.
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or
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constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), (3) or
(4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the
individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process;
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy to
the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none can be
found within the state, then to any person having the care and control of the
infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is
employed;
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person and
to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed and in the
absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody
or control of the person;
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by
the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the person
who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be served, or to that
person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be
served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the
process to the individual served;
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a
common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If no such officer
or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or
holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or
elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the
person in charge of such office or place of business;
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy thereof to the
recorder;
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of such county;
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy to the
superintendent or business administrator of the board;
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the
president or secretary of its board;
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be
brought against the state, by delivering a copy to the attorney general and any
other person or agency required by statute to be served; and
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to any member
of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary.
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign
country shall be made as follows:
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in
an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a corporation,
partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a managing
general agent; provided that such service be made by a person who is not a
party to the actton, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 18 years of age,
or who is designated by order of the court or by the foreign court; or
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(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served as ordered by the
court. Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these
rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign country, or by
order of the court. When service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this
subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or
other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be
served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence,
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be
served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process may
file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by
publication, by mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set
forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual
parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by
publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or by some
combination of the above, provided that the means of notice employed shall be
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or
practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be
served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed complete.
A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the process
specified by the court.
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the party
serving the process shall file proof of service with the court promptly, and in
any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the
process, and proof of service must be made within ten days after such service.
Failure to file proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of service shall
be made as follows:
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or the deputy of
any of them, by certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner
of service;
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit with a statement as to the
date, place, and manner of service, together with the affiant's age at the time
of service;
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or
that person's designated agent, showing publication, and specifying the date of
the first and last publications; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of a
deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United States mail, if
such mailing shall be required under this rule or by court order;
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of the court
showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United States
mail, as may be ordered by the court, together with any proof of receipt;
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be served,
duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved.
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the
process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the
name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof.
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the person
making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left for the
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person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and shall sign
his or her name thereto, and, if an officer, add his or her official title.
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceeding
where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court shall,
upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate the
newspaper and authorize and direct t h a t such publication shall be made
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and
shall be published in the English language.
(Amended effective March 1, 1988; April 1, 1990; April 1, 1996.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — Rule 4 constitutes a substantial change from prior practice. The rule modernizes and simplifies procedure relating to service of process. Although
this rule and Rule 3 retain the ten-day summons procedure for commencement of actions,
this rule endeavors to make practice under the
ten-day summons provision more consistent
with practice in actions commenced by the
filing of a complaint. The rule retains portions
of prior Rule 4. adopts portions of the present
federal Rule 4. and adopts entirely new language in other areas. The rule eliminates the
statement (appearing in paragraph (m) of the
prior rule) that all writs and process may be
served by any constable of the court. In the
committee's view, this rule does not properly
deal with the question of who may serve types
of process other than the summons and complaint. In recommending the elimination of
paragraph (m). the committee did not intend to
change the law governing eligibility to serve
such other process.
Paragraph (a). This paragraph eliminates
the prior rule's reference to the issuance of
summonses. See paragraph (b). Otherwise the
paragraph is identical to the former paragraph
(a).
Paragraph lb). This paragraph, a substantial
change from the prior rule, requires that in an
action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons, together with a copy of the complaint,
must be served within 120 days of the filing of
the complaint. The time period was borrowed
from Rule 4(j). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph makes minor
revisions to the corresponding paragraph of the
prior rule. In addition to data historically required to appear in the summons, the address
of the court and information concerning the
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney are also required.
Paragraph (d). In prescribing the persons
who may serve process, this paragraph eliminates the prior rule's distinction between instate and out-of-state service. The paragraph is
consistent with other changes in the rule designed to simplify and unify practice for instate and out-of-state service. In order to be
eligible to serve a summons or complaint, persons who are not sheriffs or other law enforcement personnel must be at least 18 years of age
at the time of service. For eligibility to make
service in a foreign country, see paragraph (f).
Paragraph (e). This paragraph and paragraphs (f) and (g) simplify, change and reorga-

nize the requirements for methods of service as
they appeared in paragraphs (e) and (f) of the
former rule. Subparagraph (e)(1) presents the
general rule for personal service on individuals
who are not infants, incompetent, or incarcerated. Subparagraph (2) deals with service on
infants and subparagraph (3) with service on
incompetent persons. Subparagraphs (1), (2)
and (3) are patterned after Rule 4(e), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (4)
deals with service on persons who are incarcerated or committed to the custody of a state
institution. Subparagraph (5) deals with service on business entities. Subparagraphs (6)
through (9) change and modernize service on
political subdivisions of the state. Subparagraphs (10) and (11) provide for service on the
state and its departments, agencies, boards and
commissions with only minor changes from the
prior rule.
Paragraph (f). This paragraph provides several alternative means by which service must
be made in foreign countries and provides for
proof of such service.
Paragraph (g). This paragraph replaces most
of paragraph (f) of the prior rule. It is designed
to permit alternative means of service where
the identity or whereabouts of the person to be
served is unknown, where personal service is
impracticable, or where a party avoids personal
service. Under the circumstances identified in
the rule, this paragraph permits the court to
fashion means of service reasonably calculated
to apprise the parties of the pendency of the
action. Use of this provision is not limited to
actions traditionally considered in rem or quasi
in rem. See Carlson v. Bos, 740 P2d 1269, 1272
(Utah 1987). The present rule eliminates specific mention of service by telegraph or telephone (in paragraph (1) of the prior rule) since
such service could be ordered under this paragraph if appropriate. The court's order of substituted service must specify the content of
service and the event or events as of which
service will be deemed complete. A copy of the
order must itself be served so that the party
served will be able to determine the sufficiency
of service and the time as of which his or her
response is due.
Paragraph (h). This paragraph replaces
paragraph (g) in the prior rule. It requires proof
of service to be filed "promptly" and in any
event before a responsive pleading is due. The
rule eliminates failure to file proof of service as
a basis for challenging the validity of service.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amendment added the Subdivision (c)(1) and (c)(3)
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reason." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863
R2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Award of attorney fees to landowners against
adjacent landowners, on the basis that the
adjacent landowners acted in bad faith by seeking attorney fees from landowners after obtaining a quitclaim deed from landowner for the
disputed property, could not be supported under either § 78-27-56(1) or this rule, because
when adjacent landowners filed their claim
there was there was no clear prohibition on the
recovery of attorney fees in undisputed quiet
title actions and finding was not made as to bad
faith on part of the adjacent landowner.
Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
—Standard
Sanctions were improper against an attorney, where opposing parties conceded that no
particular document was signed in violation of
the rule, but simply argued that even if the
attorney believed the case was well grounded
when he filed the complaint, he should have
known after he met with counsel for defendants
that the case could not go forward. Jeschke v.
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Rule 12

Utah appellate courts should use the threestandard approach in reviewing a trial court's
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1)
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact under
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing
the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule
11 was violated and any subsidiary legal conclusions under the correction of error standard;
and (3) reviewing the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanction to be
imposed under the abuse of discretion standard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah
1992); Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
The determination of whether conduct violates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis.
Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v.
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P2d 876 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Attorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342.
B r i g h a m Young Law Review. — Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579.
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597.
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues —
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v.
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 877.
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics,
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959.
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-andThink-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 339 to 349.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366.
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for
client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th
249.
Inherent power of federal district court to
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789.
Comment Note — General principles regarding imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed.
107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96
A.L.R. Fed. 13.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for infliction of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R.
Fed. 442.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in antitrust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty days
after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise
expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service;
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of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after
notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite
statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted
and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order
or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him,
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to
him; If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all
defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
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Rule 12

raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he
does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross References. — Motions generally.
U.R.C.R 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
— Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.
— Bill of particulars.
— Criteria.
— Motion to dismiss distinguished.
—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
—Explained.
—Habeas corpus.
— Improper.
—Standard.
—Standard of review.
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
— Forum-selection clause in contract.
Presentation of defenses.
— How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Divorce.
Election of remedies.

Failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted.
General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
Venue.
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
—Failure to file.
Summary judgment.
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
—Court's discretion.
—Court's initiative.
—Defenses.
—Opportunity to present pertinent material.
—Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
Waiver of defenses.
—Defect of parties.
—Defective service of process.
—Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
When issues raised.
—Failure to join indispensable party.
— Failure to pay consideration.
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Rule 52. Findings by the court,
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall,
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion
is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to
an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Adoption.
— Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
— Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
— Credibility of witnesses.
— Denial of motion.
— Divorce decree modifications.
— Easement.
— Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
— Material issues.
——Harmless error.
— Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
— Motion.
Caption.

Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
— Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties.
Judicial review.
—Assistance of counsel.
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58-37-11. District court jurisdiction to enjoin violations
— Jury trial.
(1) The district courts of this state shall have jurisdiction in proceedings in
accordance with the rules of those courts to enjoin violations of this act.
UJ it an alleged violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under
tnis section occurs, the accused may demand a jury trial in accordance with the
rules of the district courts.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 8 u
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this

act" means Laws 1971, ch. 145, which enacted
this chapter.

58-37-12. Enforcement — Coordination and cooperation
of federal and state agencies — Powers.
The department and all law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing
tnis act shall cooperate with federal and other state agencies in discharging
tneir responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled substances. To this end, they are authorized to:
W Arrange for the exchange of information between governmental
officials concerning the use and abuse of dangerous substances.
UJ Coordinate and cooperate in training programs in controlled substance law enforcement at the local and state levels.
Tit l! r r o o p e r a t e W l t h ^ e United States Department of Justice and the
utan Department of Pubic Safety by establishing a centralized unit which
will receive, catalog, file, and collect statistics, including records of
arug-dependent persons and other controlled substance law offenders
witnin the state and make the information available for federal, state,
m n
enforcement purposes.
(4) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at destroying the wild or
illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substances may be
extracted.
^History! L. 1971, ch. 145, § u , 1997,

ch.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and
the Utah Bureau of Investigation" in SubsecAmendment Notes. - The 1997 amend- tion (3).
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
S £ t / £ S n % 5 ' **?"' substituted
UtahIwhl •'JST'VS J u S t i c e and t h e a c t " meansLaws 1971, ch. 145, which enacted
Utah Department of Pubic Safety*for"Federal this chapter.

58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure
cedure.

Pro-

CD As used in this section:
(a) "Complaint" means a verified civil in rem complaint seeking forfeiture or any criminal information or indictment which contains or is
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amended to include a demand for forfeiture of a defendant's in personam
interest in any property which is subject to forfeiture.
(b) "Drug distributing paraphernalia" means any property used or
designed to be used in the illegal transportation, storage, shipping, or
circulation of a controlled substance. Property is considered "designed to
be used" for one or more of the above-listed purposes if the property has
been altered or modified to include a feature or device which would
actually promote or conceal a violation of this chapter.
(c) "Drug manufacturing equipment or supplies" includes any illegally
possessed controlled substance precursor, or any chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies possessed with intent to engage in
clandestine laboratory operation as defined in Section 58-37d-3.
(d) "Interest holder" means a secured party as defined in Section
70A-9-105(l)(m), a mortgagee, lien creditor, or the beneficiary of a security
interest or encumbrance pertaining to an interest in property, whose
interest would be perfected against a good faith purchaser for value. A
person who holds property for the benefit of or as an agent or nominee for
another, or who is not in substantial compliance with any statute requiring an interest in property to be recorded or reflected in public records in
order to perfect the interest against a good faith purchaser for value, is not
an interest holder.
(e) "Proceeds" means property acquired directly or indirectly from,
produced through, realized through, or caused by an act or omission and
includes any property of any kind without reduction for expenses incurred
in the acquisition, maintenance, or production of that property, or any
other purpose.
(f) "Resolution of criminal charges" occurs at the time a claimant who is
also charged with violations under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or
37d enters a plea, upon return of a jury verdict or court ruling in a criminal
trial, or upon dismissal of the criminal charge.
(g) "Violation of this chapter" means any conduct prohibited by Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d or any conduct occurring outside the
state which would be a violation of the laws of the place where the conduct
occurred and which would be a violation of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b,
37c, or 37d if the conduct had occurred in this state.
(2) The following are subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in
them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter;
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering,
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this
chapter;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property
described in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not
including capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this
chapter;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transporta225
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tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described
in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited
under this section unless the owner or other person in charge of the
conveyance was a consenting party or knew or had reason to know of
the violation of this chapter;
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's
knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance is subject to the claim of an
interest holder who did not know or have reason to know after the
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this chapter;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this chapter, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this chapter. An interest in property may
not be forfeited under this subsection unless it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest holder knew, had reason to know of,
or consented to the conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture.
The burden of presenting this evidence shall be upon the state;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in Section 58-37b-2,
Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or
interest in real property is subject to the claim of an interest holder
who did not know or have reason to know after the exercise of
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the interest holder did not know or have reason to know of the
conduct which made the property subject to forfeiture, or did not
willingly consent to the conduct; and
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under
this subsection unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on
the property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at any
given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced in
controlled substances law enforcement may testify to establish the
street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this subsection;
(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition carried or used during or in
relation to a violation of this chapter or any firearm, weapon, or ammunition kept or located within the proximity of controlled substances or
other property subject to forfeiture under this section; and
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(k) all proceeds traceable to any violation of this chapter. There is a
rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and currency found in
proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug manufacturing equipment or supplies, drug distributing paraphernalia, or forfeitable records of
importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances are
proceeds traceable to a violation of this chapter. The burden of proof is
upon the claimant of the property to rebut this presumption.
(3) (a) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by
any peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having
jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure without process may be
made when:
(i) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search
warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
(ii) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior
judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture
proceeding under this chapter;
(iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property
is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(iv) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property
has been used or intended to be used in violation of this chapter and
has probable cause to believe the property will be damaged, intentionally diminished in value, destroyed, concealed, or removed from
the state,
(b) Upon the filing of a complaint, the court shall immediately issue to
the seizing agency a warrant for seizure of any property subject to
forfeiture which had been seized without a warrant in a manner described
in this subsection.
(4) In the event of seizure under Subsection (3), forfeiture proceedings
under Subsection (9) shall be instituted within 90 days of the seizure. The time
period may by extended by the court having jurisdiction over the property upon
notice to all claimants and interest holders and for good cause shown.
(5) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When
property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant under
which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location
for disposition in accordance with law.
(6) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred,
distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this chapter are contraband and no property right shall exist in them. All substances listed in
Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state may be
retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or
other preservation prior to disposal or destruction by the state.
(7) All marijuana or any species of plants from which controlled substances
in Schedules I and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in
violation of this chapter, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or
are wild growths, may be seized and retained for any evidentiary or investigative purpose, including sampling or other preservation prior to disposal or
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destruction by the state. Failure, upon demand by the department or its
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in control of land or premises
upon which species of plants are growing or being stored, to produce an
appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a license, is authority for
the seizure and forfeiture of the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chapter by a finding of the
court that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in
the custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of
controlled substances laws, the court having jurisdiction over the case
shall award the property to the seizing agency. Each agency shall use the
forfeited property for controlled substance law enforcement purposes only.
Forfeited property or proceeds from the sale of forfeited property may not
be used to pay any cash incentive, award, or bonus to any peace officer or
individual acting as an agent for the agency, nor may it be used to supplant
any ordinary operating expense of the agency. The seizing agency shall
pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defendant
in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency,
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if within a prosecution district,
the district attorney for legal costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture
and upon application for the property to the director of the Division of
Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the need for the property
and the use to which the property will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications
for property submitted under Subsection (8)(b) and, if the seizing agency
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and
advisability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or
agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to exceed
the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property. Any
proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing agency
or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a)
or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property
by public bidding or as considered appropriate, by destruction. Proof of
destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of
the department or his designated agent.
(9) Forfeiture proceedings shall be commenced as follows:
(a) For actions brought under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(j), a
complaint shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if within a
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prosecution district, the district attorney, or the attorney general, and filed
in a court of record where the property was seized or is to be seized. In
cases in which the claimant of the property is also charged as a criminal
defendant, the complaint shall be filed in the county where the criminal
charges arose, regardless of the location of the property. The complaint
shall include:
(i) a description of the property which is subject to forfeiture;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) the allegations of conduct which gives rise to forfeiture.
(b) In cases where a claimant is also charged as a criminal defendant,
the forfeiture shall proceed as part of the criminal prosecution as an in
personam action against the defendant's interest in the property subject to
forfeiture. A defendant need not file a written answer to the complaint, but
may acknowledge or deny interest in the property at the time of first
appearance on the criminal charges. If a criminal information or indictment is amended to include a demand for forfeiture, the defendant may
respond to the demand at the time of the amendment.
(i) Unless motion for disposition is made by the defendant, the
determination of forfeiture shall be stayed until resolution of the
criminal charges. Hearing on the forfeiture shall be before the court
without a jury. The court may consider any evidence presented in the
criminal case, and receive any other evidence offered by the state or
the defendant. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the
evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or release of the
property as it determines.
(ii) A defendant may move the court to transfer the forfeiture
action, to stay all action, including discovery, in the forfeiture, or for
hearing on the forfeiture any time prior to trial of the criminal
charges. Either party may move the court to enter a finding of
forfeiture as to defendant's interest in part or all of the property,
either by default or by stipulation. Upon entry of a finding, the court
shall stay the entry of judgment until resolution of the criminal
charges. Any finding of forfeiture entered by the court prior to
resolution of the criminal charges may not constitute a separate
judgment, and any motion for disposition, stay, severance, or transfer
of the forfeiture action may not create a separate proceeding. Upon
the granting of a motion by the defendant for disposition, stay,
severance, or transfer of the forfeiture action, the defendant shall be
considered to have waived any claim that the defendant has been
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
(iii) Any other person claiming an interest in property subject to
forfeiture under this subsection may not intervene in a trial or appeal
of a complaint filed under this subsection. Following the entry of an in
personam forfeiture order, or upon the filing of a petition for release
under Subsection (e), the county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general may proceed with a separate in rem action to resolve any
other claims upon the property subject to forfeiture.
(c) A complaint seeking forfeiture under Subsection (2)(k) shall be
prepared by the county attorney, or if within a prosecution district, the
district attorney, or by the attorney general, either in personam as part of
a criminal prosecution, or in a separate civil in rem action against the
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property alleged to be proceeds, and filed in the county where the property
is seized or encumbered, if the proceeds are located outside the state. A
finding that property is the proceeds of a violation of this chapter does not
require proof that the property is the proceeds of any particular exchange
or transaction. Proof that property is proceeds may be shown by evidence
which establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) that the person has engaged in conduct in violation of this
chapter;
(ii) that the property was acquired by the person during that period
when the conduct in violation of this chapter occurred or within a
reasonable time after that period; and
(iii) that there was no likely source for the property other than
conduct in violation of the chapter.
(d) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the
clerk of the court, and served upon all persons known to the county
attorney or district attorney to have a claim in the property by:
(i) personal service upon a claimant who is charged in a criminal
information or indictment; and
(ii) certified mail to each claimant whose name and address is
known or to each owner whose right, title, or interest is of record in
the Division of Motor Vehicles to the address given upon the records
of the division, which service is considered complete even though the
mail is refused or cannot be forwarded. The county attorney, district
attorney, or attorney general shall make one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was made
for all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are
believed to have an interest in the property.
(e) Except under Subsection (9)(a) in personam actions, any claimant or
interest holder shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint
within 20 days after service. When property is seized under this chapter,
any interest holder or claimant of the property, prior to being served with
a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court having
jurisdiction for release of his interest in the property. The petition shall
specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney or, if within a
prosecution district, the district attorney in the county of the seizure, who
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a
complaint of forfeiture.
(f) For civil actions in rem, after 20 days following service of a complaint
or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer
is on file, the court shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or
release of the property as the court determines. If the county attorney or
district attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the
court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to
recovery of the property, it shall enter an order directing the county
attorney or district attorney to answer the petition within ten days. If no
answer is filed within that period, the court shall order the release of the
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing. At this hearing
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all interested parties may present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall
determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and
order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines.
(h) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited.
(i) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, the
court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure,
storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund,
(j) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture
proceeding, including seizure and storage of the property, against the
individual or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture,
and may assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the
property as appropriate.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 13; 1982, ch.
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, § 2;
1990, ch. 304, § 1; 1991, ch. 142, § 1; 1992,
ch. 121, § 2; 1993, ch. 38, § 59; 1996, ch. 198,
I 31; 1996, ch. 294, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote
Subsection (9)(a).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 294, effective
April 29, 1996, rewrote the section.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this
act" in Subsection (5) means Laws 1971, ch.
145, which enacted this chapter.
Cross-References. — Division of Finance,
§ 63A-3-101.
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, Title
58, Chapter 37b.
Utah Controlled Substances Precursor Act,
Title 58, Chapter 37c.
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, Title 58,
Chapter 37a.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

•Bonafide"security interest.
Consent.
Double jeopardy.
—Applicability.
—"Multiple proceedings.
Evidence.
Excessive forfeiture.
—Constitutional protections.
^-Instrumentality analysis.
forfeiture of vehicle.
Grounds for denial.
""-•Not found.
Nature of forfeiture.
^sumption pertaining to currency.
^bable cause exception.

Property right.
Purpose of section.
Requirements for forfeiture.
—Description of property.
—Interest in property.
—Reason for possession.
—Violation of chapter.
"Bona fide" security interest.
To establish a security interest as "bona fide"
under this section, one must only establish an
actual, good faith interest in the property not
derived by fraud or deceit. State v. One 1979
Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
An unperfected security interest is a "bona
fide" security interest under this section. State
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*1254 994 P.2d 1254
387 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2000 UT 17
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
REAL PROPERTY AT 633 EAST 640 NORTH,
OREM, UTAH, Defendant,
Linda Cannon, Appellant.
No. 980117.
Jan. 19, 2000.
County attorney filed action seeking forfeiture of
residence pursuant to Controlled Substances Act based
on alleged warehousing of illegal drugs on premises.
The Fourth District Court, Provo Department I, Ray
M. Harding, Sr., J., ordered forfeiture of property.
Appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 942 P.2d
925, affirmed in part and remanded in part for entry
of findings of fact and conclusions of law on
constitutional challenges. On remand, the District
Court denied owner's request for oral argument, and
signed state's proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and owner again appealed. The
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that forfeiture of
residence was grossly disproportionate penalty, given
small size of drug operation and relatively light
sentence imposed.
Reversed.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
West Headnotes
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against excessive fines, once it has been demonstrated
that the defendant property is an instrumentaUty of the
offense, the court must next examine whether the
ordered forfeiture is "grossly disproportionate" to the
offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.
[3] F i n e s t 1.3
174 —
174kl.3 Excessive Fines.
(Formerly 110kl214)
The proportionality prong of an excessiveness
inquiry challenging a forfeiture of real property as
excessive fine is guided by objective criteria,
including: (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) the harshness of the
forfeiture; (3) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (4) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.
[4] Fines <©==> 1.3
174 —
174kl.3 Excessive Fines.
(Formerly 110kl214)
For purposes of determining whether a forfeiture of
real property is unconstitutionally excessive fine, the
court should analyze the gravity of the offense factor
in light of: (1) the harm caused by the illegal activity,
including, in the drug trafficking context, the amount
of drugs and their value, the duration of the illegal
activity, and the effect on the community; and (2) the
actual sentence the defendant received as a result of
the offense compared to the maximum punishments
authorized. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.

[1] Fines <&* 1.3
174
174kl.3 Excessive Fines.

[5]Fines<@=>1.3
174 —
174kl.3 Excessive Fines.

(Formerly 110kl214)
The threshold test in determining whether the
forfeiture of real property violates the federal
constitutional prohibition against excessive fines is
whether the defendant property is an instrumentality
of the offense. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 8.

(Formerly 110kl214)
For purposes of determining whether a forfeiture of
real property is unconstitutionally excessive, the court
should analyze the harshness of the forfeiture factor in
light of: (1) the fair market value of the property; (2)
the intangible, subjective value of the property; and
(3) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect
of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial
condition. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.

[2] Fines <®=> 1.3
174 —
174kl.3 Excessive Fines.
(Formerly 110kl214)
In determining whether the forfeiture of real
property violates the federal constitutional prohibition

[6] Forfeitures <@==*5
180 —
180k5 Proceedings for Enforcement.
Factual findings made by trial courts in conducting
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inquiries into the alleged excessiveness of a forfeiture
must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.
[7] Criminal Law <®^> 1139
110 —
110XXTV Review
110XXJV(L) Scope of Review in General
110kll39 Additional Proofs and Trial De Novo.
The question of whether a fine is constitutionally
excessive requires the application of a constitutional
standard to the facts of the individual case, and thus
de novo review of the question is appropriate.
[8] Fines ® ^ 1.3
174 —
174kl.3 Excessive Fines.
(Formerly 110kl214)
[See headnote text below]
[8] Drugs and Narcotics @=*191
138 —
138II Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
13811(E) Forfeitures
138kl91 Property Subject to Forfeiture.
Forfeiture of residence upon defendant's convictions
for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
possession of cocaine, illegal drug tax, and possession
of drug paraphernalia was grossly disproportionate
penalty, where defendant's drug operation was very
small, actual fines, surcharges, and penalties of
$9,660.10 were imposed, defendant received sentence
of probation, and forfeited real property had value of
approximately $80,000. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.
*1255 James Taylor, Laura Cabanilla, Provo, for
plaintiff.
Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
HOWE, Chief Justice:
t 1 Linda Cannon appeals from a trial court-ordered
forfeiture of her real property located at 633 East 640
North in Orem, Utah (the "defendant property"),
following her conviction for several drug-related
offenses. She contends that the forfeiture violated
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and
excessive fines. She also assigns as error the trial
court's taking judicial notice on remand of the final
disposition of criminal proceedings arising out of two
later searches of the defendant property, alleging that
the trial court thereby violated her constitutional due
process rights.
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1f 2 This matter is before us for the second time. On
Cannon's previous appeal, we remanded the case to
the trial court for an entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding her constitutional claims.
See State v. 633 East 640 North, 942 P.2d 925 (Utah
1997). We refer the reader to our opinion in that case
for a full recitation of the relevant facts. Briefly
stated, following a seizure of narcotics, drug
paraphernalia, and related monies found during a
warranted search (the "first warranted search"), the
Utah County attorney, on behalf of the State of Utah,
brought this action to forfeit the defendant property
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13, the Utah
Controlled Substances Act ("UCSA"). In the next
eighteen months, two additional searches—and
additional seizures of drugs and drug paraphernaliawere conducted. A jury convicted Cannon on several
drug charges stemming from the first search. (FN1)
After undergoing a sixty-day evaluation in the Utah
State Prison's Diagnostic Unit, the trial court placed
her on probation and ordered her to enter and
complete a drug treatment program.
K 3 Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the
forfeiture of the defendant property, valued at between
$71,272.30 and $80,000.00. Cannon subsequently
appealed the *1256 forfeiture order to this court.
We affirmed the trial court's rulings; however, we
remanded the case for an entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the constitutional challenges so
that we could address the trial court's alleged
violations of Cannon's constitutional protections
against excessive fines and double jeopardy.
f 4 On remand, both Cannon and the State filed
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law;
Cannon also filed a request for oral argument. The
trial court denied the request for oral argument and
signed the State's findings of fact and conclusions of
law, taking judicial notice of the second and third
searches of the defendant property and the resolution
of resultant criminal charges against her. Cannon
now appeals, claiming her state and federal
constitutional due process protections (FN2) against
excessive fines (FN3) and double jeopardy (FN4)
have been violated.
ANALYSIS
I. FORFEITURE AS AN "EXCESSIVE FINE"
f 5 Cannon contends that the trial court-ordered
forfeiture of her residence violated her state and
federal constitutional protections against the

Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

994 P.2d 1254, State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, Utah, (Utah 2000)
imposition of excessive fines. However, because
Cannon fails to support her state constitutional
arguments with any substantive analysis, these
arguments do not warrant separate analysis under the
Utah Constitution. Accordingly, we decide this case
on the basis of the United States Constitution alone.
See State v. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d 534, 539 n.
7 (Utah 1994); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224
n. 2(UtahCt.App.l995).
U 6 Because the law in Utah is unsettled, our holding
today sets forth the analysis for use in future forfeiture
cases under the Excessive Fines Clause. In doing so,
we draw upon the following cases: United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141
L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); United States v. 6380 Little
Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995); 392 South
600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (quoting United States v.
9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th
Cir. 1994)).
^1 7 Before turning to Cannon's specific arguments,
it is first necessary to examine the history of excessive
fines analysis.
The United States Constitution
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed....11 U.S. Const, amend.
VIE. The historical foundation and reasoning behind
current excessive fines analysis has been well
documented elsewhere; a brief history is sufficient
for our purposes here. (FN5)
f 8 In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113
S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines
Clause applied to drug-related forfeitures of property.
Id. at 622, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Court, however,
declined to estabhsh a specific test to determine when
a forfeiture should be considered constitutionally
excessive, deciding instead to "allow the lower courts
to consider that question in the first instance." Id. at
622-23, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (citations omitted). Justice
Scalia proposed that the sole measure of excessiveness
should be the relationship between the defendant
property and the offense, i.e., the property's
"instrumentality." Id. at 627-28, 113 S.Ct. 2801
(Scalia, J., concurring). The majority considered
Scalia's "instrumentality test," but stated: "We do not
rule out the possibility that the connection between the
property and the offense may be relevant, but our
decision today in no way limits [lower courts] from
considering other factors in determining *1257
whether the forfeiture of ... property was excessive."
Id. at 623 n. 15, 113 S.Ct. 2801.
^ 9 Since Austin, "there has been little uniformity
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both within and between the circuits as to the
appropriate test to determine excessiveness. In order
to promote uniformity, it is desirable to standardize
the analysis used to determine when specific
forfeitures violate the Excessive Fines Clause."
Caione, supra note 5 at 1095; see also United States
v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F.Supp. 1389, 1397-98 &
nn. 16-19 (M.D.Ala. 1994) (noting existence of cases
adopting each of following tests:
pure
instrumentality, pure proportionality, multifactor, and
a combined instrumentality and proportionality test).
In Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141
L.Ed.2d 314 (1998), however, the United States
Supreme Court clarified the requisite standard.
Realizing the inherent subjectivity and imprecision in
judicial determinations of the gravity of an offense,
and examining how the legislature has treated
constitutional excessiveness in other contexts, the
Court rejected a strict proportionality test in favor of a
"gross disproportionality standard." Bajakajian, 524
U.S. at 329, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
Tf 10 We have addressed the issue of forfeitures as
excessive fines on only a few occasions. In the most
recent wstance--pre-Bajakajian--v/e followed the
suggestion in Austin that "the connection between the
defendant property and the offense is the beginning
point, rather than the sole criterion, in determining
whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive."
392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (citation
omitted). We declined to estabhsh any further steps
in the analysis, stating that as future situations arise in
which an instrumentality analysis is not dispositive,
we would address additional factors at that time. See
id. at 542.
TJ 11 Now, the Bajakajian opinion provides us with
the second prong to our excessive fines test merely
hinted at in 392 South 600 East, namely, gross
disproportionality. The Ninth Circuit prescribed a
similar two-prong test in 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995) (*6380 Little Canyon Road
"). There, the court indicated that "instrumentality is
a threshold test.... If the government succeeds in
showing a substantial connection between the property
... and the offense, then the claimant has the burden to
show that forfeiture of his property would be grossly
disproportionate given the nature and extent of his
criminal culpability." Id. at 985 (footnotes omitted).
[1][2] If 12 We similarly hold that the threshold test
in real property forfeitures (FN6) is whether the
defendant property is an instrumentality of the
offense. If instrumentality is proven, we must then
examine whether the ordered forfeiture is "grossly
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disproportionate" to the offense. However, because
in the instant case we rest our decision on gross
disproportionaUty, we will assume for purposes of
discussion, but not decide, that the instrumentality test
has been satisfied.
f 13 We now examine whether the forfeiture is
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
In 392 South 600 East, we stated: "As future cases
present situations in which the instrumentality analysis
is not dispositive, we can address other factors that
may be comprehended by an excessive fines
analysis." 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542.
One of the "future cases" we foresaw is now before
us. Fortunately, because of Bajakajian, we are no
longer left entirely to our own devices in addressing
what these "other factors" may be.
T| 14 The Bajakajian court clarified the
excessiveness analysis, rejecting strict proportionality
and adopting instead a "gross disproportionaUty"
standard, declaring:
In applying this standard, the district courts in the
first instance, and the courts of appeals, reviewing
the proportionaUty determination de novo, must
compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity
of *1258 the defendant's offense. If the amount of
the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the defendant's offense, it is
unconstitutional.
524 U.S. at 331, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (footnotes omitted).
This, then, provides the second prong for future
excessiveness analyses.
1. The test in theory
U 15 The individual factors Bajakajian set forth to
determine the gravity of a specific offense are those
articulated in the United States Supreme Court's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause precedents. See
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330-31, 118 S.Ct. 2028
(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct.
3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), overruled on other
grounds by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111
S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); (FN7) Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63
L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). These precedents suggest that
the proportionaUty prong of an excessiveness inquiry
"should be guided by objective criteria, including (i)
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction; and (ui) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other
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jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct.
3001. Upon review of the Solem test, the Bajakajian
court has determined and this court now determines
that it is adaptable for use in forfeiture cases.
U 16 Instead of applying a strict Solem test,
however, both parties have focused on a sample Ust of
factors we cited in Nephi. Cannon asserts that these
factors show the forfeiture here was grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The
State uses the same factors to contend just the
opposite. (FN8)
Tf 17 The factors that we suggested in Nephi were
factors the Eighth Circuit used in its excessiveness
analysis. Those factors included " 'the monetary
value of the property, the extent of criminal activity
associated with the property, the fact that the property
was a residence, the effect of forfeiture on innocent
occupants of the residence, including children, or any
other factors that an excessive fines analysis might
require.' " 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542
(quoting United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27
F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir.1994)). The Ninth Circuit, in
6380 Little Canyon Road, utilized a similar and
somewhat more expansive analysis:
once the
government proves instrumentaUty, "the claimant has
the burden to show that forfeiture of his property
would be grossly disproportionate given the nature
and extent of his criminal culpabiUty." 6380 Little
Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 985. To determine the
forfeiture's harshness, the Ninth Circuit set forth three
factors: "(1) the fair market value of the property;
(2) the intangible, subjective value of the property,
e.g., whether it is the family home; and (3) the
hardship to the defendant, including the effect of the
forfeiture on defendant's family *1259 or financial
condition."
Id. To determine the defendant's
culpabiUty, that court looked at:
(1) whether the owner was negUgent or reckless in
allowing the illegal use of his property; or
(2) whether the owner was directly involved in the
illegal activity, and to what extent; and
(3) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including
(a) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of
drugs and their value, (b) the duration of the illegal
activity, and (c) the effect on the community.
U. at 986.
Tf 18 We beUeve these factors complement the Solem
test. We realize that the judicial determination of the
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gravity of a particular offense, as the Bajakajian court
indicated, is inherently subjective and imprecise.
However, use of these factors in conjunction with the
Solem test will lessen the subjectivity of the analysis,
acting as effective gauges for the gravity of an
offense. (FN9) Therefore, we hold that the Solem
test, using the factors set forth above from 392 South
600 East and 6380 Little Canyon Road to complement
the court's analysis, is the appropriate measure of
excessiveness in this jurisdiction. (FN 10)
f 19 One additional factor is necessary to complete
an excessiveness analysis:
the comparative
punishment factor.
"In considering an offense's
gravity, the other penalties that the Legislature has
authorized are certainly relevant evidence."
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 332 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
In Bajakajian, the defendant faced a maximum fine of
$250,000.00 plus five years' imprisonment. See id.
These figures suggest, as the Court stated, that
Congress, in authorizing these punishments, did not
view the offense as trivial. See id.
The actual
sentence the defendant received was three years'
probation and a $5,000.00 fine. See id. at 324, 118
S.Ct. 2028. The Court continued, holding that
the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to which
respondent was subject were but a fraction of the
penalties authorized ... undercuts any argument
based solely on the statute, because they show that
respondent's culpability relative to other potential
violators of the ... provision—tax evaders, drug
kingpins, or money launderers, for example—is
small indeed. This disproportion is telling....
Id. at 332 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028.
Finding
disproportionality, the Court held full forfeiture would
violate the Excessive Fines clause, and thereby
affirmed the lower courts' rulings and rejected the
government's appeal. Id. at 335, 118 S.Ct. 2028
T[ 20 Including this factor in the final test makes
sense. After all, two separate individuals, convicted
of an "identical" crime may receive vastly different
sentences based on inherently individualized facts.
During sentencing, the defendant's culpability is
evaluated, and punitive measures are meted out
accordingly. The harsher the sentence, fines, and
penalties a defendant receives, the less likely it is that
a forfeiture may be grossly disproportionate. If a
defendant receives only a small percentage of the
"maximum" possible penalty, it is more likely—
although still not dispositive—that the forfeiture may
be constitutionally excessive.
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[3] [4] [5] U 21 In short, a court must look at four
main factors:
(1) the gravity of the particular offense;
(2) the harshness of the forfeiture;
(3) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and
(4) the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.
In gauging the gravity of the offense (factor (1)
above), a court should take into consideration:
(a) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including
(i) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of
drugs and their value, (ii) the duration of the illegal
activity, and (iii) the effect on the community; and
*1260 (b) the actual sentence the defendant received
as a result of the offense compared to the maximum
punishments authorized.
In judging the harshness of the forfeiture (factor (2)
above), a court should look at:
(a) the fair market value of the property;
(b) the intangible, subjective value of the property,
e.g., whether it is the family home; and
(c) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect
of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial
condition.
2. The test as applied to the instant case
[6] [7] f 22 Factual findings made by trial courts in
conducting excessiveness inquiries must be accepted
unless clearly erroneous. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at
331 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing Anderson v.
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct.
1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)).
However, the
question of whether a fine is constitutionally excessive
requires the application of a constitutional standard to
the facts of the individual case. In that context, de
novo review of the question is appropriate. See id.
(citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697,
116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
[8] f 23 The police seized from the defendant
property less than two pounds of marijuana in three
searches within eighteen months, with a street value
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of approximately $7,200.00. The trial court found
that " [forfeiture of this real property has served a
remedial purpose of removing this drug house from
the stream of narcotic commerce, thereby serving the
public by removing a drug safehouse from its ongoing
criminal use, and by cleansing the site of significant
and ongoing drug distribution activities." The trial
court concluded that the "forfeiture is the result of
extensive, serious conduct by the claimant [Cannon]
which presented significant threat of harm and cost to
society."
f 24 We do not condone any degree of drug
trafficking; we recognize the great cost the State
incurs in investigating, pursuing, and convicting
offenders. We also understand the broad-scale effect
of drug trafficking on society. As the trial court
observed: "The use and sale of controlled substances
is one of the single most serious factors affecting and
utilizing the resources" of the courts and the criminal
justice system, both on the state and federal level.
However, these findings and conclusions are not
sufficient to support this forfeiture in view of other
factors.
t 25 Measured by any standard, Cannon's drug
operation was small, involving possession of less than
two pounds of marijuana for sale in an eighteen month
span. The trial court apparently agreed with this
assessment at the time of trial when Cannon was
placed on probation, although a jury had found her
guilty of three felonies and a misdemeanor on charges
stemming from the first search of her home. See
supra note 1. The court allowed her to remain on
probation after being convicted of an additional felony
resulting from the second search. Cannon's actual
fines and surcharges imposed on charges arising out
of the first and second searches (FN 11) totaled only
$4,625.00. Cannon was also subject to $5,035.10 as
a tax or penalty for possessing nonstamped illegal
drugs. In sum, the actual fines, surcharges, and
penalties imposed amounted to $9,660.10.
If 26 The State argues that Cannon faced "maximum
possible penalties" of approximately $130,425.00 and
"substantial" prison time. It repeatedly stresses these
"maximum possible penalties," contending that these
amounts should be used for measurement, as opposed
to the actual penalties. The trial court also used these
theoretical figures extensively in addressing the
gravity of Cannon's offenses in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court on remand
declared simply that the "value of the property
forfeited does not grossly exceed the potential fines
and fees in this case."
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f 27 The State argues that this fact alone shows that
the forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate.
However, the State does not provide any legal support
for its comparison of theoretical maximum penalties
with the *1261. value of the forfeited property.
(FN 12) While reference to the maximum penalties is
helpful in determining the gravity of the offenses, it
has limited relevance in detennining proportionality.
Here, the trial court placed too much reliance on the
maximum penalties in its analysis of proportionality
instead of focusing on the actual fines and penalties
imposed.
If 28 When we compare the (1) gravity of Cannon's
conduct;
(2) the actual fines, surcharges, and
penalties of $9,660.10 imposed; and (3) her probation
on the prison and jail sentences, with the value of the
forfeited real property at approximately $80,000.00,
we must conclude that there is a gross
disproportionality here under the standards set forth in
Bajakajian, and the forfeiture cannot be sustained.
H. JUDICIAL NOTICE AS DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION
f 29 Cannon contends that the trial court violated
her due process rights by taking judicial notice of the
second and third searches of the defendant property as
well as the resolution of criminal charges stemming
from the second search. It is unnecessary to reach
this question.
In our above analysis of
disproportionality,
we have
considered
the
controverted evidence regarding the second and third
searches, but determined that the totality of all
evidence does not raise Cannon's offenses to a level
sufficient to overcome the disproportionality.
If 30 We additionally do not need to reach Cannon's
contention regarding double jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
f 31 Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude
that assuming the house was an instrumentality of the
defendant's drug offenses, the second prong of the
"excessive fine" analysis is not met. The forfeiture of
the defendant property is grossly disproportionate.
Having decided the case on this basis, appellant's
other arguments on appeal are rendered moot.
If 32 Judgment reversed.
f 33 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice
ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON concur in
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Chief Justice HOWE's opinion.
K 34 Justice STEWART concurs in the result.
(FNL) Cannon was convicted of: (1) possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree
felony, for which she was sentenced to prison for
zero to five years; (2) possession of cocaine, a
second degree felony, for which she was sentenced
to one to fifteen years; (3) illegal drug tax, a third
degree felony, for which she was sentenced to zero
to five years;
and (4) possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, for which she
was sentenced to not more than six months in jail.
All terms were ordered to run concurrently.
Additionally, Cannon was fined $2,000.00, and an
additional $1,700.00 surcharge was imposed.
(FN2.) See U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const,
art. I, § 7 .
(FN3.) See U.S. Const, amend. VIE; Utah Const,
art. I, § 9 .
(FN4.) See U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const,
art. I, § 12.
(FN5.) For a more extensive recitation of the
analytical background to excessive fines protection
and forfeiture, see generally, 392 South 600 East,
886 P.2d 534; Kristen Michelle Caione, Note,
When Does In Rem Civil Forfeiture Under 21
U.S.C. 881(a)(7) Constitute an Excessive Fine?: An
Overview and an Attempt to Set Forth a Uniform
Standard, 47 Syracuse L.Rev. 1093 (1997).
(FN6.) We note that an instrumentality inquiry is not
relevant in cases dealing with the forfeiture of
monies. Instead, such cases are examined using
solely a proportionality determination.
See
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329 & n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 2028;
United States v. $273,969.04 United States
Currency, 164 F.3d 462, 466 n. 3 (9th Cir.1999).
(FN7.) Harmelin overrules Solem insofar as
proportionality relates to an analysis under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. However, Bajakajian, decided seven
years after Harmelin, specifically references Solem
in
discussing
the
standard
of
gross
disproportionality.
(FN8.) The trial court, having adopted the State's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as
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its own, addressed some of these factors and some
of the Solem factors, albeit cursorily. Concerning
the excessiveness issue, the trial court concluded:
6. Forfeiture of the property described in this
complaint is not excessive.
a. There is a close nexus of the property to the
extensive and continued criminal conduct of the
claimant in this case.
b. The value of the property forfeited does not
grossly exceed the potential fines and fees in this
case.
c. The forfeiture will not significantly impact other
residents of the property since all but one have also
been implicated in the criminal conduct giving rise
to forfeiture.
d. The forfeiture is the result of extensive, serious
conduct by the claimant which presented significant
threat of harm and cost to society.
e. Forfeiture of this property does not impose
hardship upon the claimant that is more extensive or
severe than would have been imposed for other,
equally serious conduct, under the laws of the State
of Utah.
f. Forfeiture of property established to have been an
instrumentality for the sale of drugs is authorized by
virtually every state and federal government.
*1261_ (FN9.) We note that none of these factors,
taken individually, is dispositive. These factors
should be considered and weighed together.
(FN10.) The first two factors used in 6380 Little
Canyon Road to determine culpability are more
concerned with establishing instrumentality. We
therefore will not include these two factors in our
proportionality test.
(FN11.) Charges arising out of the third search were
dismissed.
(FN 12.) In fact, at oral argument, upon being asked
whether there was case law from which they derived
this test, counsel for the State admitted that "I'm not
sure that we relied on a case when we came up with
our idea. I think that was just something we thought
of."
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conduct by the claimant which presented significant
threat of harm and cost to society.
e. Forfeiture of this property does not impose
hardship upon the claimant that is more extensive or
severe than would have been imposed for other,
equally serious conduct, under the laws of the State
of Utah.
f. Forfeiture of property established to have been an
instrumentality for the sale of drugs is authorized by
virtually every state and federal government.
*1261_ FN9. We note that none of these factors,
taken individually, is dispositive. These factors
should be considered and weighed together.
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FN 10. The first two factors used in 6380 Little
Canyon Road to determine culpability are more
concerned with establishing instrumentality. We
therefore will not include these two factors in our
proportionality test.
FN11. Charges arising out of the third search were
dismissed.
FN 12. In fact, at oral argument, upon being asked
whether there was case law from which they derived
this test, counsel for the State admitted that "I'm not
sure that we relied on a case when we came up with
our idea. I think that was just something we thought
of."
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